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Introduction
The study of international negotiations has been one of the most elusive
topics for an empirically testable formal analysis in part because it is not
always easy to obtain empirical data on the internal motives which influence
the decisions and on the bargaining processes and outcomes in negotiations.1 It
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1
 It must be noted at the outset that unlike many other studies on negotiation we are not much
concerned with bargaining skill and tactics in this paper. In this sense our usage of the term
negotiation is somewhat unorthodox. This point will become clear in the course of our treatment
of the problem. Studies of international negotiation abound. For a survey of this field, see, for
example, F. Ikle, How Nations Negotiate (New York: Harper, 1964); J. Sawyer and H. Guetzkow,
"Bargaining and Negotiation in International Relations," in International Behavior: A
Social-Psychological Analysis, H. C. Kelman, ed. (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston,
1964), pp. 464-520; D. Druckman, ed., Negotiation: A Social Psychological Perspective (New
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230 International Organization
is often believed that only after those involved in the negotiations speak out
and public documents are released can one understand the full scope of in-
ternational negotiations. Without denying this truth, we will attempt to show
that certain types of negotiations can be modeled on the basis of publicly
available data. Using the data on the Soviet-Japanese negotiations for salmon
catch in the Northwest Pacific for the period 1957-1977, which are available
in official publications and newspapers, we will construct a simple model of
the negotiations, drawing some insights from the study of budgeting. We will
propose that the negotiations can be properly conceptualized as a type of
quasi-budgeting in which two actors play the roles of a quasi-requester and a
quasi-appropriator respectively. Like budgeting, the negotiation outcomes are
reasonably predictable in the sense that regular small-scale changes in the
outcomes are observed. More concretely, we will use an analogy that in the
Soviet-dominated sea, Japan makes a "request" on the amount of salmon
catch to the Soviet Union which in turn makes an "appropriation" on it—with
both actors basing their calculations mainly on their previous experiences of
quota determination.
We will use this analogy for the analysis of the Soviet-Japanese salmon
catch negotiations with the belief that the same kind of analysis could be
profitably applied to certain types of other issues and thus could be
methodologically generalizable. Let us give some examples. First, let us try
predicting the impact of the tide of the 200-mile jurisdictions on ocean
management.2 Regarding exclusive economic or fishing zones, fishing states
are almost inevitably drawn into bilateral (or multilateral) negotiations with
coastal states, in which the former makes a sort of "request" as to the amount
of fish catch allowed while the latter makes a sort of "appropriation" about it.
Another pertinent example would be manganese nodule exploitation under an
International Seabed Authority, a proposed global regime in the UNCLOS.3
York: Halstead, 1977); Journal of Conflict Resolution, special issue devoted to negotiation, XXI,
4 (Dec. 1977); O. R. Young, ed., Bargaining: Formal Theories of Negotiation (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1975); A Rapoport and A. Chammah, Prisoner's Dilemma: A Study in Conflict
and Cooperation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1965).
2
 As for the transformation in ocean politics and its related topics, see the following: J. R.
Stevenson and B. H. Oxman, "The Perspectives for the Law of the Sea Conference," American
Journal of International Law 68 (1974): 1-13; "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law
of the Sea: The 1974 Caracas Session," American Journal of International Law 69 (1975): 1-30;
and "The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session,"
American Journal of International Law 69 (1975): 763-797; B. H. Oxman, "The Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The 1976 New York Session," American Journal of
International Law 71 (1977): 247-269; J. I. Swing, "Who Will Own the Oceans?" Foreign Affairs
54 (1976), 527-546; J. I. Charney, "Law of the Sea: Breaking the Ocean Deadlock," Foreign
Affairs 55 (1977): 598-629; R. E. Osgood, ed., Perspectives on Ocean Policy (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975); A. L. Hollick and R. E. Osgood, eds., New Era of
Ocean Politics (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); A. L. Hollick, "Seabeds Make
Strange Politics," Foreign Policy 9 (1972-73): 148-70; and "What to Expect from a Sea Treaty,"
Foreign Policy 18 (1975): 68-78; E. Miles, ed., Special Issue: Restructuring Ocean Regimes, In-
ternational Organization 31 (1977); and R. O. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Jr., Power and In-
terdependence: World Politics in Transition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976).
3
 Osgood, op. cit.; Miles, op. cit.; and Keohane and Nye, op. cit.
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How much should be exploited and allocated to whom would be discussed and
negotiated within the institution and within that internal bureaucratic process,
a certain type of request-appropriation phenomenon can be foreseen. Al-
though the distinction between a "requester" and an "appropriator" would
be less sharp and more complicated in this case than in bilateral fishery nego-
tiations, it would nevertheless give rise to the repeated adjustment process
which is somewhat analogous to the budgetary process. A third example of its
applicability might be trade negotiations on such products as automobiles,
textiles, ships, or TV sets between importing and exporting countries.4 Given
the increasing domestic pressure against the actuality and possibility of the
rising rate of unemployment in many industrialized countries, despite the
often ritual condemnation of protectionism by their governments, the process
of making restrictions on the import of a certain kind of products, whether
they are "voluntary restraints" or import quotas, has certain features in
common with the budgetary process, even if the process of import restrictions
does not take place annually. A fourth example would be the economic
summits of the major advanced industrialized countries in which one of the
three strong "locomotive" countries, Japan, is "requested" to reflate its
domestic economy more vigorously than before and lead, together with the
other two, the world economy out of recessions.5 Here again the budgetary
analogy applies. Suppose the request at the summit is the 8 percent economic
growth rate for Japan. Being normally very sensitive to foreign criticism,6
Japan pledges or promises or "expresses its hope" to achieve, say, 7 percent as
a sort of "appropriation." It must be noted that this example represents a very
loose form of a quasi-budgeting phenomenon. A fifth example is commodity
negotiations between producers/exporters and consumers/importers under
international commodity agreements on such commodities as coffee, tin, and
cocoa.7 Although such producers/exporters and consumers/importers have
equal votes as prescribed by the Havana Charter of 1948, consumers/
importers have tended to have a stronger say about the matter for the last
thirty years, although producers/exporters have become more self-assertive
since the early 1970s. Our sixth example is the two special "non-governmen-
tal" trade negotiations between China and Japan in 1962-1973, namely, the
Liao-Takasaki and Memorandum Trade negotiations.8 In the negotiations
4
 See, for example, R. N. Cooper, "Trade Policy is Foreign Policy," Foreign Policy 9 (1972):
18-36; and C. F. Bergsten, "Let's Avoid a Trade War," Foreign Policy 23 (Summer 1976): 24-31.
5
 See, for example, A. Watanabe, "Foreign Policy Making, Japanese Style," International




 See, for example, J. W. F. Rowe, Primary Commodities in International Trade (Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press, 1965); L. N. Rangarajan, Commodity Conflict: The
Political Economy in International Commodity Negotiations (London: Croom Helm, 1978); H.
Hveem, The Political Economy of Third World Producer Associations (Oslo: Univer-
sitetsforlaget, 1978).
* C. J. Lee, Japan Faces China: Political and Economic Relations in the Post-War Era
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976); and J. S. Hoadley and S. Hasegawa,
"Sino-Japanese Relations 1950-1970: An Application of the Linkage Model of International
Politics," International Studies Quarterly 15, 2 (June 1971): 131-157.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003215X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:19:37, subject to the Cambridge Core
232 International Organization
Japan wanted to have more trade with China, which in turn used this trade
relationship as leverage for influencing Japan's policy toward China and Japa-
nese internal politics. Every year during the period in which negotiations to
determine the amount of trade took place, Japan played the role of a quasi-re-
quester and China that of a quasi-appropriator. (One year after the diplomatic
normalization between them in 1972, this "non-governmental" trade rela-
tionship was abolished.)
What runs through these examples can be abstracted in order to show the
potential generalizability of our framework into other issue areas. First, there
is a sort of requester-appropriator relationship in which an appropriator is
bound to take a requester's "demand" seriously despite an appropriator's
capacity to have a strong say on the matter in question. Second, there is an
institutional or quasi-institutional setting, even if it is very loosely structured,
in which the matter is bilaterally (or sometimes multilaterally) discussed
and/or negotiated fairly regularly and which is nearly decomposable from
other elements of a larger system.9 (Here we use the term nearly decomposable
perhaps a little more loosely or freely than Ando, Fisher, and Simon.) Third, a
more technical but no less important requirement comes in, namely, at least
one aspect of the negotiation processes and at least one aspect of the
negotiation outcomes have to be revealed preferably in quantitative terms. We
say "preferably" because we believe the absence of readily available quan-
titative data should not prevent the application of the framework from being
attempted. We ought to be able to proceed case by case in this respect, using
various techniques for quantification at our disposal. Here it is perhaps
necessary to remember that a good grasp of the subject concerned and a little
imagination and ingenuity on the part of an analyst make a difference in the
"art" of quantification.10 These three requirements for the application of the
quasi-budgeting framework—it is important to note—can be used as the basic
clues for identifying social interactions which can be conceived of as
quasi-budgeting. A more detailed, situation-specific list of conditions or
requirements for the application of the quasi-budgeting framework to a
particular phenomenon has to be spelled out—a task which will be attended
to in our study of the Soviet-Japanese salmon catch negotiations.
It must be noted at the outset that we are aware of the fact that there is
always more than one way of explaining the same phenomenon and that our
9
 About the concept of near decomposability, see H. A. Simon and A. Ando, "Aggregation of
Variables in Dynamic Systems," Econometrica 29 (April 1961): 11-138; F. M. Fisher, "On the
Cost of Approximate Specification in Simultaneous Equation," Econometrica 29 (April 1961):
139-170; F. M. Fisher and A. Ando, "Two Theorems in Ceteris Paribus in the Analysis of
Dynamic Systems," American Political Science Review 61 (March 1962): 103-113; and H. A.
Simon, The Science of the Artificial (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1969), Chapter 4. Most
briefly, in nearly decomposable systems, "the interactions among the subsystems are weak but not
negligible" and "the subsystems only interact in an aggregate form." (Simon, op. cit., 1969, pp.
100 and 107).
10
 On this point, see, for example, T. Inoguchi, "Measuring Friendship and Hostility among
Communist Powers: Some Unobtrusive Measures of Esoteric Communication," Social Science
Research 1 (April 1972): 79-105.
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quasi-budgeting framework is one such example.11 The salient point is,
however, whether or not a particular framework is able to perform com-
petently in explanation and/or prediction, depending on the purpose of a
study.
In our study we will first present a brief history of Soviet-Japanese
negotiations on the salmon catch in the Northwest Pacific. This will help
readers understand why the salmon catch negotiations can be conceptualized
as a sort of budgeting. Second, we will argue that negotiations of this sort can
best be conceived of as quasi-budgeting. We will delineate five major features
of the negotiations in order to show that the negotiations can be basically
captured by a certain type of the theory of budgeting, which conceives of the
process as an internal bureaucratic one. Third, after briefly discussing data
sources, we will formulate and elaborate our model incorporating both aspects
of negotiation processes and outcomes—in relation to budgeting—and show
the estimation results for the 1957-1976 negotiations and the adjusted
"predicted" values for the 1977 negotiations. Finally, we will draw our
conclusions.
Soviet-Japanese salmon catch negotiations
Before tackling the problem of how to model the negotiations between the
two world fishery powers, we have to look briefly at the history of fishing in
the Northwest Pacific.12 Around the turn of the century Japan started de-
veloping fishing in this area. The area—rich in fish stock—was made a
virtually exclusive Japanese zone by such factors as: 1) Japan's naval
dominance in the Northwest Pacific after 1905 (the Japanese were victorious
over Russia in the war of 1904-1905); 2) its fishing technology and skill; and 3)
its need for fish protein. Russia, and later the Soviet Union, was not very
11
 See, for example, J. Kurth, "A Widening Gap: The Logic of American Weapons
Procurement," Public Policy XIX (1971): 373-405; and P. A. Gourevitch, "International Trade,
Domestic Coalitions, and Liberty: Competitive Responses to the Crisis of 1873-1896," Journal of
Interdisciplinary History VIII, 3 (Autumn 1977): 281-313.
12
 The following works provide the most useful and detailed historical accounts of Japanese
fishing and its position in the world after World War II. Kawakami Kenzo, Sengo kokusai gyogyo
seidoshi (A History of Post-World War II International Fisheries Institutions) (Tokyo: Dai Nihon
Suisan Kai, 1975); G. Borgstrom, Japan's World Success in Fishing (London: Fishing News,
1964); Nihon Keizai Shimbun, Kaiyo Nihon no shumatsu (The End of Maritime Japan) (Tokyo:
Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1977); Mainichi Shimbun, Nihyaku kairi sakana senso (200-mile Fish
War) (Tokyo: Mainichi Shimbun, 1977), B. Johnson and F. Langdon, "Two Hundred Mile
Zones: The Politics of North Pacific Fishes," Pacific Affairs 49 (1976): 5-27, provides a good
summary of the historical background of fishing in the North Pacific. Also see O. R. Young,
Resource Management at the International Level: The Case of the North Pacific (New York:
Nichols 1977); and L. M. Alexander, "Regional Arrangements in the Oceans," American Journal
of International Law 71 (1977): 84-109. As for the day-to-day accounts of the 1977 negotiations,
see major Japanese newspapers, e.g., Nihon Keizai Shimbun from December 1976 to August 1977.
It may be interesting to compare the Soviet-Japanese fishery conflict of 1977 with other cases such
as the Anglo-Icelandic Cod War of 1972-1973. On the Cod War, see J. Hart, The
Anglo-Icelandic Cod War of 1972-1973: A Case Study of Fishery Dispute (Berkeley: Institute of
International Studies, University of California, 1976).
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active in fishing in the area, although there were some fishery disputes between
the two countries, which prompted them to conclude a fishery agreement in
the 1920s. In 1945, however, Japan's dominance—both naval and fishery—in
the area came to an end. The Allied Occupation Forces set up the so-called
MacArthur Line beyond which Japanese merchant ships and fishing boats
were prohibited. The neighboring countries—including the Soviet Union, South
Korea, China, and the United States—drew lines to prevent Japanese fish-
ing boats from operating within certain zones in an attempt to counteract
the renewed fishery expansion of Japan, which had been expected to follow its
independence in 1952 and was subsequently confirmed. They were led to make
renewed restrictions on Japanese fishing in their coastal areas. Two con-
sequences derived partially from these regulations and restrictions. First,
driven out of much of what was considered to be its traditional fishing areas,
Japan established new fishing areas all over the world, only to achieve world
dominance in fishing. Second, bilateral or multilateral fishery arrangements
were set up to minimize fishery disputes. Because Soviet-Japanese fishery
disputes in the Northwest Pacific in 1952-1956 were very serious and salient,
the two countries arranged the Joint Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Commission in
the Northwest Pacific. This was prescribed in the Soviet-Japanese Northwest
Pacific Fisheries Convention, concluded in May 1956, prior to the diplomatic
normalization between Japan and the Soviet Union which was signed in
December 1956. (The Convention became effective at the time of the
diplomatic normalization.) Newspaper coverage in Japan on the annual
fishery negotiations prescribed in the Convention has been considerable since
1957, indicating that the fishery negotiations have been a pertinent issue in
Soviet-Japanese relations.
The Commission was to be composed of three members from each
country and aided by a large number of specialists. The Convention prescribed
an initial ten-year period in which neither party could abrogate the treaty and
thereafter only if one-year advance notice had been given. The Convention
applied to the entire area of the Northwest Pacific, roughly west of 175° west
longitude, and regulated anadromous species like salmon and ocean trout,
demersal species like pollack, and surface-feeding species like herring. In
addition to the Convention of 1956, two separate agreements were drawn up
between Japan and the Soviet Union for the regulation of fishing for shellfish,
called tsubu in Japan, and crabs. (There is also a non-governmental agreement
to regulate the Japanese seaweed catch around the disputed Southern Kurile
Islands.) The Commission was to convene every year in the spring for
negotiations to determine the modes of fishing in the area before the fishing
season began. When the Commission could not reach consensus, negotiations
dragged on into the fishing season itself. This phenomenon was used tactically
at one time or another by the Soviet Union when it wanted Japan to accept
without protest the former's "appropriation" in light of the daily decreasing
salmon stock within the fishing zone. (Salmon and ocean trout climb up from
the ocean to Soviet domestic rivers in late spring and summer every year, so
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that it is pointless to attempt to get a high quota while salmon stock is
diminishing.)
The explicitly stated goal of the 1956 convention was to attain the
"maximum sustainable productivity" (in the Japanese text) or "the maximum
sustainable fish catch" (in the Russian text). However two features of this
fishery regime were in evidence in actual practice: 1) joint preservation and
exploitation of the fisheries on the basis of the maximum sustainable yield;
and 2) the assertion of hegemonial coastal state's rights on the adjacent sea.
The latter aspect received gradually more emphasis in the course of in-
troducing various regulations such as a decrease in the number of factory ships
and fishing boats and a decrease in the number of fishing days, as well as a
gradual increase in fishing ban areas and fishing holiday areas in the North-
west Pacific. (Most of the Okhotsk Sea was off limits by the mid-1960s.) By
1977 the latter characteristic had been further emphasized. After the stampede
of the developed countries (i.e. the United States, Canada, and the EEC) to set
up a unilateral claim to 200-mile exclusive economic or fishing zones in 1976,
the Soviet Union decided to defend its self-interest late in 1976 by taking
similar action. In reaction, Japan too established its 200-mile boundaries in
spring 1977 when heated and prolonged negotiations were being held to
counter the Soviet claim on the disputed Southern Kurile Islands, now made
explicit by the Soviet 200-mile declaration of 1976. Then the Soviet Union
gave a one-year advance notice to Japan in spring 1977 that it would abrogate
the Convention of 1956. This was an attempt to force Japan to become more
"practical and business-like" and to concentrate on fishery issues, rather than
highlighting territorial issues about which the Soviet Union made it crystal
clear that it would never give an inch. Subsequently, in 1977, a substantial
portion of the Northwest Pacific fell under the Soviet 200-mile exclusive
zones, where the Soviet Union came to wield its power far more freely than
before. The Soviet Union and Japan were among the few countries to have
persistently resisted the introduction of the 200-mile limits in the UNCLOS
before 1974 and 1977 respectively. It was in their best interests to keep in-
ternational law basically intact as it had been practiced for centuries.
However, they reversed their positions on ocean order in 1976-77 in order to
defend their self-interests in a somewhat adverse situation. In 1978
negotiations took place under a new agreement in which far more areas were
banned to Japanese fishermen, although the Soviet Union has continued to
accommodate Japanese salmon fishing, albeit with stricter regulations.
Negotiation as quasi-budgeting
Having briefly described the context in which the Soviet-Japanese salmon
catch negotiations were held for the last twenty years, we are now in a position
to conceptualize the negotiations as quasi-budgeting. There are five major
characteristics which are outstanding in the negotiations.
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First, there is an asymmetry of commitment between Japan and the Soviet
Union which can be approximately viewed as the relationship between a
requester and an appropriator in budgeting. The Soviet Union has both the
desire and capability to control the Northwest Pacific area and its resources,
whereas the Japanese commitment has tended to focus on fishery issues,
avoiding potentially or actually explosive issues such as security, territory, and
the "China" factors. Japan and the Soviet Union both see each other as a
potential enemy, and there have been mutually contradictory claims over four
small islands in the southern part of the Kurile Islands since 1945. The
Sino-Soviet conflict since the early 1960s has complicated these two issues. It
was Mao who "encouraged" the Japanese territorial claim against the Soviet
Union in mid-1960s.13 Furthermore, the Japanese catch quota is discussed in
the negotiations, whereas the Soviet catch quota is presented by the Soviet
Union and is almost automatically approved by the Commission. Thus
determining the Japanese catch represents a relationship between Japan and
the Soviet Union similar to that between a requester and an appropriator in
budgeting.
Second, there is the continuity and repetition of the organizational task
(i.e. the annual definition of the maximum sustainable yield), the principle to
which both Japan and the Soviet Union committed themselves in the 1956
Convention. As in budgeting, the same organizational task is carried out anew
each year.
Third, the negotiations entail a great number of technical and pro-
fessional aspects as evidenced by the predominant and preeminent presence
of technocrats, bureaucrats, and specialists. The negotiations deal with highly
technical and practical matters traditionally conceived within the confines of
"low politics" which, when not politicized, are best handled by professionals.
This aspect is similar to budgeting in which most of the hard work is handled
by bureaucrats.
Fourth, there is relative independence in decision making. Legally
speaking, the Soviet-Japanese Fishery Commission had the capacity to amend
the Convention of 1956 without necessarily referring to the respective home
governments, unlike most fishery agreements now existing in other parts of the
world. It is again like budgeting in which the Bureau of Budget, the Ministry
of Finance in the case of Japan, or the Office of Management and Budget in
13
 As for Soviet-Japanese relations, see D. C. Hellman, Japanese Foreign Policy and Domestic
Politics: The Peace Agreement with the Soviet Union (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1969); S. Vishwanathan, Normalization of Japanese-Soviet Relations, 1945-1970 (Tallahassee,
Florida: The Diplomatic Press, 1973); Y. C. Kim, The Soviet-Japanese Relations: Interactions of
Politics, Economics and National Security, The Washington Papers No. 21 (Beverly Hills: Sage,
1974); V. N. Berezin, Kurs na dobrososedstvo i sotrudnichestvo i ego protivniki: iz istorii nor-
malizatsii otnoshenii SSSR s poslevoennyi Iaponiei (The Course of Friendship and Cooperation
and Its Enemies: From the History of the Normalization of the USSR's Relationship with
Post-War Japan) (Moscow: IzdatePstvo 'Mezhdunarodnoe Otnoshenie' 1977). As for Mao's
reference to the Kurile Islands, see C. J. Lee, op. cit., p. 67.
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the case of the United States have relative independence in decision making,
although the final appropriation is made in parliament or congress.
Fifth, the members of the Commission remained relatively stable and
fixed for many years. This fact created something similar to a sense of com-
munity, which was further enhanced by the salience of the above-mentioned
technical and professional aspects of the Commission's negotiations. In
budgeting, the Bureau of Budget or the O.M.B. maintain their own sense of
community and even their ideology for long periods of time.14 The Com-
mission was not as cohesive as those offices but this feature was shared.
If we look at the structural components of the Soviet-Japanese salmon
catch negotiations in more abstract terms, the latter four components, when
taken together, can be seen as approximating the above-mentioned second
condition for the quasi-budgeting framework, namely, that there is an in-
stitutional or quasi-institutional setting in which the matter concerned is
bilaterally (or sometimes multilaterally) discussed and/or negotiated
repeatedly and which is nearly decomposable. In other words, the negotiations
become an "encapsulated conflict,"" to use one of Etzioni's concepts. The
world's two largest fishery powers found a mutual interest in the regional
fishery regime called the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries Commission. Political
conflicts were thus successfully internalized and most of the time the
negotiations took on a routine ritual aspect.
In order to make clearer how two entirely different things, namely,
negotiation and budgeting, can be related to each other, it is necessary to
indicate briefly how we get suggestions from two budgeting theories. The
first is the theory of incrementalism. It states that budgeting follows an in-
crementalism by which the budget of one year is the sum of that of the
previous year and some relatively stable increment. Budgeting is conceived of
as an internal bureaucratic process rather than as an externally determined
event.16 In our research, we were struck by the fact that the negotiators' point
of reference always seemed to be the previous salmon catch or the previous
allowance. The mode of basing calculations on recent past experiences is
essential to these negotiations, and we will use this analogy in our
equation-building enterprise. The second budgeting theory we considered is
that of action-reaction, which states that the reaction to action by an ad-
versary determines budgeting. This theory conceptualizes budgeting as an
14
 As for Japanese budgeting, see John C. Cambell, Contemporary Japanese Budget Politics
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977). As for American budgeting, see, for example, A.
Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964).
15
 A. Etzioni, The Active Society (New York: Free Press, 1968).
16
 A. Wildavsky, op. cit.; O. A. Davis, M. A. H. Dempster, and A. Wildavsky, "A Theory of
the Budgetary Process," American Political Science Review 60 (1966): 529-547; R. M. Cyert and
J. G. March, A Behavioral Theory of the Firm (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
1962); J. P. Crecine, Governmental Problem-Solving: A Computer Simulation of Municipal Bud-
geting (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1969); F. W. Hoole, Politics and Budgeting in the World Health
Organization (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1977).
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outcome determined largely by the interactions of international adversaries.17
In our research, not only the incremental aspect of the negotiations is striking,
but the interactional aspect as well. The latter aspect seems to be more salient
to the behavior of Soviet negotiators, who punish the Japanese for overfishing
and at the same time try to preserve the overall salmon stock in the Northwest
Pacific on the basis of a stricter notion of the maximum sustainable yield.
Since this study deals with negotiations, but not with budgeting as it is
normally conceived, we will not be constrained by these theories any more
than is necessary and useful for our model construction. Thus, for instance,
we will not exclude factors exogenous to the negotiations in our
equation-building enterprise. We will get hints and insights from these
theories, especially from the first one, without being straitjacketed by them. It
is not our purpose to conduct a "crucial test" of these and other theories.18
Empirical analysis
Having presented our basic approach, we are now in a position to sub-
stantiate it empirically. Before going into an empirical analysis, however, we
shall briefly discuss data sources.
Data sources
Official publications and newspapers are used as the data sources for this
study. Neither extensive nor intensive interviewing with those involved in the
17
 L. E. Richardson, Arms and Insecurity (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1960); M. C. McGuire,
Secrecy and the Arms Race (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965); T. L.
Saaty, Mathematical Models of Arms Control and Disarmament (New York: Wiley, 1968); P.
Smoker, "The Arms Race as an Open and Closed System," Peace Research Society Papers 7
(1967); 41-62; M. Wolfson, "A Mathematical Model of the Cold War," Peace Research Society
Papers 9 (1968): 107-123; J. V. Gillespie, D. A. Zinnes, G. S. Tahin, P. A. Schrodt, and R. M.
Rubinson, "An Optimal Control Model of Arms Race," American Political Science Review 71
(1977): 225-244; J. V. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes, "Embedded Games Analysis and International
Conflict Model," Behavioral Science 22 (1977): 22-31; D. L. Brito, "A Dynamic Model of an
Armaments Race," International Economic Review 13 (1972): 357-375; W. H. Baugh, "Response
to Sudden Shifts in a Two-Nation Arms Race," Behavioral Science 22 (1977): 69-86; W. H.
Baugh, "Transient-Response Analysis of Richardson-Type Arms Race Models," in
Mathematical Systems in International Relations Research, J. V. Gillespie and D. A. Zinnes, eds.,
(New York: Praeger, 1977), pp. 221-263; U. Luterbacher, Dimensions historiques des modeles
dynamiques de conflit: application aux processus de course aux armements, 1900-1965 (Leiden:
Sijthoff, 1974); N. Choucri and R. C. North, Nations in Conflict: National Growth and In-
ternational Violence (San Francisco: Freeman, 1975).
18
 As for a "crucial test," see J. R. Platt, "Strong Inference," in The Step to Man (New York:
Wiley, 1966), pp. 19-36. It is interesting to see that Ostrom has recently tested a Richardson type
arms race model and a Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky type organizational politics model as
applied to U.S. defense budgeting, with indistinguishable, indeterminate results. This fact might
indicate the necessity for a more careful conceptual examination before the "crucial test." See C.
W. Ostrom, Jr., "Evaluating Alternative Politics Model: An Empirical Test between an Arms
Race Model and Organizational Politics Model," Journal of Conflict Resolution 21 (1977):
215-266.
terms of use, available at https:/www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002081830003215X
Downloaded from https:/www.cambridge.org/core. University of Basel Library, on 30 May 2017 at 16:19:37, subject to the Cambridge Core
Negotiation as quasi-budgeting 239
negotiations was possible. Soviet elites were, needless to say, not accessible.
Furthermore, Japanese bureaucrats, while accessible, were either quite
tight-lipped or very inarticulate about the negotiations. Perhaps this was
intentional, due in part to the fact that the difficult 1977 negotiations were
taking place when the first author of this paper interviewed a number of them.
Thus, less was learned from the negotiators than can be found in newspaper
accounts. Controlled leaks from "reliable sources" to newspapers is not un-
common in Japan." This fact enables us to safely rely on newspapers for some
of our data sources.
The initial commitment to incorporate into the model both the process
and outcome of the negotiations led us to investigate how one aspect of the
outcome (i.e. the agreed quota for the Japanese salmon catch) was arrived at.
For this purpose the initial proposals of Japan and the Soviet Union for the
Japanese salmon catch, which are reported in the Nihon Keizai Shimbun
(Japan Economic Newspaper) have been chosen.20 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun
has been carefully read for the period from December to July 1957-1977, for
the figures for the initial proposals. Checking these figures against those given
by the Fishery Agency of the Government of Japan has resulted in the
following observations: 1) the figures reported in Japanese newspapers are
strikingly accurate due to the government's controlled leaks; 2) there are a few
instances in which some small divergences are found on the order of 100 to
1,000 metric tons when proposals range from 50,000 to 170,000 metric tons;
and 3) due to an official regulation that the Fishery Agency not make official
documents public until three years after their publication for internal
bureaucratic circulation, we have opted to use the figures as reported in the
Nihon Keizai Shimbun to ensure the uniformity of data sources. Besides the
initial catch proposals, we have at our disposal the agreed quota for the
Japanese catch, the actual catch figure of both countries, and the planned
catch figure of the Soviet Union, all of which are reported in an official
publication of the Government of Japan, On the Soviet-Japanese Fisheries
Commission.11 The consumer price of salmon in the Tokyo area is also
reported in an official publication, The Annual Report of the Consumer Price
Index.12 Full use of these data enables us to build a model showing how the
initial proposals are transformed into the agreed quota.23
" See, for instance, N. B. Thayer, "Competition and Conformity: An Inquiry into the
Structure of the Japanese Newspapers," in E. F. Vogel, ed., Modem Japanese Organization and
Decision-Making (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 284-303.
20
 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun is a Japanese Wall Street Journal or Financial Times. The
coverage of the negotiations does not differ very much from one newspaper to another among big
newspapers in Japan. However, the Nihon Keizai Shimbun seems to provide a most dispassionate
reporting about them.
21
 Nisso gyogyo iinkai ni tsuite (Tokyo: Fishery Agency, Government of Japan, 1976).
22
 Shohisha bukka shisu nempo (Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, Office of Prime Minister,
Government of Japan).
" The data set may be obtained from the authors upon request.
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Four single-equation models
A structural equation model is used to explain how the agreed quota is
causally related to other variables endogenous or exogenous to the
negotiations. Four single equation models will be separately constructed and
no attempt will be made to construct a simultaneous equations model. The
four equations attempt to explain the Japanese initial proposal for the
Japanese catch of the year concerned (JIP), the Soviet initial proposal for the
Japanese catch of the year concerned (SIP), the agreed quota for the Japanese
catch of the year concerned (AQJC), and the Soviet catch plan of the year
concerned (SP).
Before going into the description, elaboration, and justification of the
model, it is helpful to make the following observations about the agreed
quota. (See Figures 1 and 2.) First, the quota decreased steadily as a trend, if
not year by year. Second, it is generally the case that in the odd-numbered
years which happen to be good harvest years because of the biological cycle of
ocean trout, a higher quota is allotted than in the even-numbered years which
happen to be poor harvest years. This is why we find a two-year time lag in
several variables in some of the following equations. Third, there was a sharp
jump between 1961 and 1962, which resulted in a drastic increase in the quota
for the salmon catch. In other words, after 1962, much of the previously
unregulated salmon catch came under regulation. Fourth, the first few years
showed some irregularities which may be viewed as an organizational learning
or trial-and-error process.
JIP equation
We have the following JIP equation:
JIP,= a, + b,,AQPR, + e,,
where
AQPR, = AQJC,.2PRSM,.,;
JIP,: the Japanese initial proposal for year t;
AQJC,_2: the agreed quota for the Japanese catch two years earlier;
PRSM,.,: the consumer price of salmon per unit in Tokyo one year
earlier;
a,: a constant term;
eu: an error term;
b n is anticipated to be negative.
The JIP equation has only one explanatory variable, i.e., AQPR. AQPR,
is the multiplicative term of AQJC,_2 and PRSM,_i. That is to say, the agreed
quota for the Japanese catch two years earlier multiplied by the consumer
price of salmon per unit in Tokyo one year earlier. AQPR can be ap-
proximated to be the expected amount of Japan's salmon catch sales in the
year concerned. We hypothesize that the expected market sale of salmon
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determines the Japanese initial proposal negatively. In other words, if the
expected sale in yen is large (small), the Japanese initial proposal in terms of
metric tons can decrease (increase). Some may think that a high price for
salmon would lead to a higher Japanese initial proposal, since it would in-
dicate that more fish could be sold at a remunerative price. However, Japanese
negotiators cannot escape from the decreasing trend of salmon stock and thus
from the Japanese catch quota. Given the strict Soviet annual "ap-
propriation," they seem to be aware that a high initial proposal would not help
increase the quota very much anyway, and this is based on their early ex-
periences with Soviet negotiators in the late 1950s. In other words, when the
elasticity of supply is very small and when the growth of supply is negative as a
trend, if not year by year, Japanese negotiators can only console themselves
with the thought that the expected amount of salmon sales increases, if not its
catch quota, because price goes up when supply decreases. Besides the market
mechanism which pushes up its price when supply falls, the Japanese have
strong fishery oligopolists who can benefit even by resorting to contrived
shortages. (What is worse, Japanese negotiators seem to be fully aware of an
important loophole, namely, that Japanese fishermen tend to overfish salmon
stock "secretly" beyond the agreed quota of the Japanese catch.) For these
reasons, we anticipate b n to be negative. In this equation we are basically
following the first theory of budgeting, although JIP, is formulated to be de-
termined neither by AQJC'2 nor by JIP,_2 but by AQJC,.2- PRSM,.,. Since
we are not straitjacketed by the first theory of budgeting, the exogenous
variable, PRSM,.,, comes into this equation.
SIP equation
We have the following SIP equation:
SIP, = a2 + b21AQJC,.2 + b22TC,.2 + e2,
where
TC,.2 = JC,.2 + SC,.2;
SIP,: the Soviet initial proposal for year t;
AQJC,.2: the agreed quota for the Japanese catch two years earlier;
TC,.2: the total catch two years earlier;
JC,_2: the Japanese catch two years earlier;
SC,.2: the Soviet catch two years earlier;
a2: a constant term;
e2r: an error term;
b2, is anticipated to be positive and b22 negative.
There are two variables to explain the Soviet initial proposal. One is the
agreed quota for the Japanese catch two years earlier. The other is the sum of
both the Japanese catch and Soviet catch two years earlier. The former
variable has a positive relationship vis a vis the Soviet initial proposal, while
the latter variable has a negative relationship vis a vis the Soviet initial
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proposal. In other words, when the agreed quota for the Japanese catch two
years before is large, then the Soviet initial proposal is large; and when the
total catch is large', then the Soviet initial proposal tends to be small. The latter
relationship makes sense when we take into account the fact that the Soviet
Union has been more strongly concerned than Japan has with the depletion of
fishery resources in the Northwest Pacific which the Soviet Union tends to see
as quasi-territorial waters. In this equation we are getting insights from the
first and second theories of budgeting. In the sense that SIP, is formulated to
be partially determined by AQJC,.2, if not by SIP,.2) the equation is basically
following the first theory. But in the sense that SIP, is formulated to be par-
tially determined—and determined negatively—by TC,.2> the equation can be
illuminated by the second theory which sees interaction between parties as very
important.
AQJC equation
We have the following AQJC equation:
AQJC, = a3 + b3, JIP, + b32 SIP, + e3,
where
AQJC,: the agreed quota for the Japanese catch for year t;
JIP,: the Japanese initial proposal for year t;
SIP,: the Soviet initial proposal for year t;
a3: a constant term;
e3,: an error term;
b31 is anticipated to be positive and b32 positive.
The AQJC equation has two independent variables. One is the Japanese
initial proposal. The other is the Soviet initial proposal. Both b3, and b32 are
naturally anticipated to be positive. In the equation we are simply stating that
AQJC, is determined by the initial proposals of both countries.
SP equation
We have the following equation:
SP, = a4 + b4l SC,.2 + b42DJCSC,.2 + e4,
where
DJCSC,.2 = JC,.2 - SC,.2for the odd-numbered years
= 0 for the even-numbered years
SP,: the Soviet plan for year t;
SC,_2: the Soviet catch two years earlier;
DJCSC,_2: the difference between the Japanese catch two years
earlier and the Soviet catch two years earlier in the
odd-numbered years;
JC,.2: the Japanese catch two years earlier;
a4: a constant term;
e4t: an error term;
b4J is anticipated to be positive and b42 positive.
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The SP equation has two explanatory variables. One is the Soviet catch
two years before. Thus b4, is naturally anticipated to be positive. The second
variable is the difference between the Japanese catch two years earlier and the
Soviet catch two years earlier for the odd-numbered years which happen to be
fishing harvest years due to the two-year biological cycle of ocean trout. It is
important to emphasize that the second variable applies only to the odd-
numbered years. The Soviet Union, more strongly concerned about fishery
resource depletion than Japan, seems to attempt to achieve parity in the odd-
numbered years, i.e. good harvest years, while in the even-numbered years,
it seems to be satisfied with around one half of the Japanese catch. Thus, b42 is
anticipated to be positive. In the equation we are getting insights from both the
first and second theories. In the sense that SP, is formulated to be partially
determined by SC,_2, if not by SP,_2, we are following the first theory. On the
other hand, when we formulate that SP, is partially determined by DJCSC,_2,
we are seeing an interactive term which is very important.
Estimation results
Tables 1 and 2 summarize the estimation results both for the 1957-1976
periods and for the 1964-1976 period. Figures 3 to 6, which will be seen later,
show the performance of the model in relation with the observed JIP, SIP,
AQJC, and SP variables for the 1957-1976 period." The equations are
separately estimated with the ordinary least squares method. The overall
results are basically satisfactory. First, when the regression coefficients are
assumed to have a particular sign, they do in fact have that sign. Second, the
R2 statistics range from .620 to .907 when we deal with the 1964-1976 period.
When we deal with the 1957-1976 period, two of the R2s become fairly small
and in the case of the JIP equation the R2 decreases to .115 and in the case of
the SIP equation the R2 decreases to .306. However, except for the 1959-1961
period, the fits between the observed and estimated values are fairly good.25 In
light of these facts, we have presented the results both for the 1957-1976 and
1964-1976 periods. (It is definitely not because we have wanted to purge
"unfriendly" observations.)26 Third, the Durbin-Watson statistics show fairly
" It must be noted that the JIP, SIP, and SP equations do not produce the estimated values of
1962 and 1963 because we have to exclude the 1962 and 1963 values. The 1962 policy intervention
changed the definition of the regulated areas and thus the equations which encompass the
pre-1962 and post-1962 years cannot include the 1962 and 1963 values due to the inclusion of
two-year lagged variables.
" When we look at the observed values of the JIP and SIP in Figures 3 and 4, we are not too
discouraged by the two low R2s for the 1957-1976 period. There are some reasons for them. First,
the Japanese initial proposal of 1959 was more than 150,000 metric tons, which was "too high"
when compared to the Soviet initial proposal of 1959, which was 50,000 metric tons. Second, the
Soviet initial proposals did not change at all during the 1959-1961 period, perhaps in an attempt to
make Japan aware of the Soviet message not to make too high a proposal on the Japanese side. We
can do nothing about these facts and the two low RJs for the 1957-1976 period do not make the
analysis particularly less strong.
26
 The problem here is posed largely by a small number of observations, which is inherent in the
research design. We could have included another (probably dummy) variable to account for this
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Table 1: Estimated results of the four equations (the 1957-1976 period) and







































































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
• Significant at the .05 level.
** SP was not revealed in the 1977 negotiations.
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Table 2.: Estimated results of the four equations (the 1964-1976 period) and







































































Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.
* Significant at the .05 level.
** SP was not revealed in the 1977 negotiations.
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satisfactory values ranging from 1.44 to 2.70. Although the Durbin-Watson
statistics by themselves cannot prove or disprove the absence of a serial
correlation, these values do suggest that a serial correlation is not a serious
problem in these equations.27 Fourth, the residual plots of the equations seem
to show no clearly discernible systematic components outside of perhaps the
JIP equation for the 1957-1976 period. Examination of the residual plots for
the JIP equation for the 1957-1976 period shows the weak but discernible
tendency that the higher the values of the dependent variable, the higher the
absolute values of the residuals. If we look at Figure 3, however, it is im-
mediately clear that the first three years, 1959-1961, are those which cause this
phenomenon. Besides these years, there are no problems with residual plots.28
Fifth, F-statistics show that 71.4 percent of the regression coefficients for the
1957-1976 period are statistically significant at the 5 percent level. In sum,
64.3 percent of the regression coefficients reported in Tables 1 and 2 are
statistically significant at the 5 percent level (those with asterisks in Tables 1
and 2). Sixth, perusal of outliers indicates that most of the outliers are con-
centrated in the first three years, i.e., 1959-61. All this seems to demonstrate
that the overall performance of these equations is fairly good, although we do
not deny that some slightly discouraging factors are not entirely absent. They
are largely inherent in the research design itself where the number of ob-
servations is small. This is a situation with which social scientists too often
have to live and the limitations are not taken to be so severe as to vitiate the
analysis. In other words, the theoretical framework that we have chosen for
the salmon catch negotiations' model has proved its basic correspondence with
the empirical facts. Figures 3 to 6 present this information graphically.
The "predicted" values for the dependent variables for 1977 will be
computed in order to further substantiate the following two points: 1) the
overall validity of the model; and 2) the continuous presence of most of the
structural components of the Soviet-Japanese salmon catch negotiations in
1977. We have predicted the 1977 values by applying the observed inde-
"anomaly"ofthe 1959-1961 period. However, this has not been done, in part because the number
of observations of this period is only three. If we have a two-year lag term in an equation, when
the number of observations for the whole period (sixteen or thirteen) is already very small, the
degree of freedom is even further reduced. There is no point in introducing another variable into
the equation if it is not certain that the variable is very powerful. When it is a dummy variable, that
variable does not contribute to a better explanation of the dependent variable even if its in-
troduction makes the results look better. Also it has not been done because we have wanted to
keep the model as simple as possible. Thus the problem of the two low R2s is not so severe as to
vitiate the analysis.
" As for the problem of how to deal with serial correlation in a time series analysis, see, for
example, P. Rao and R. L. Miller, Applied Econometrics (Belmont, California: Wadsworth,
1971); and D. A. Hibbs, Jr., "Problems of Statistical Estimation and Causal Inference in
Time-Series Regression Models," in Sociological Methodology 1973-1974, H. L. Costner, ed.
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1974), pp. 252-308.
28
 For the same reasons mentioned in footnote 26 we have not attempted to "save" this
somewhat slightly discouraging phenomenon. The problem is inherent in the research design and
the resulting problem is not so severe as to vitiate the analysis.
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pendent variables of either 1975 or 1976 or 1977 values of the independent
variables, depending on a particular time lag of each variable, to the estimated
model structure. The results as summarized in the lower parts of Tables 1 and
2 demonstrate that the adjusted "predicted" values can be approximated to the
actual values. The adjustment was necessitated by the Soviet ban of salmon
catch within its 200-mile zone. We subtracted 18,000 metric tons which is
generally estimated as the amount of the Japanese salmon catch within the
Soviet 200-mile zone.29 In other words, the quotas for 1977 apply only to the
areas outside the Soviet 200-mile zone in contrast to the previous quotas. The
difference between the actual values and adjusted "predicted" values range
from 700 metric tons to 2,300 metric tons in the case of the 1964-1976 models,
while it ranges from 800 metric tons to 8,800 metric tons in the case of the
1957-1976 models. In short, the predictive performance is basically good.
However, the following further observations must be made. The predictive
performance of the 1964-1976 models is better than that of the 1957-1976
models except for the AQJC, equation. This can be explained by the
trial-and-error phenomenon of the first few years. And the predictive per-
formance for the JIP, and SIP, equations is worse than that for the AQJC,
equation. This makes sense when we realize that the initial proposal equations
might be somewhat contaminated by exogenous variables, which are presumed
to be omitted, while the AQJC equation is accounted for largely by variables
endogenous to the negotiations. Important among them might be the shifts of
the political and economic factors within and outside each country and the
differences in bargaining strategies, neither of which have been incorporated
into our models.30
The good predictive performance seems to demonstrate that, in spite of
the drift toward the enclosure of the oceans, most of the structural com-
ponents of the Soviet-Japanese salmon catch negotiations have not been
altered. The asymmetry of commitment between the Soviet Union and Japan
as well as the commitment by the Soviet Union and Japan to the principle of
keeping up with the maximum sustainable yield have not been fundamentally
transformed. Both nations were committed to the organizational task of
defining the maximum sustainable yield. The Soviet declaration of 200-mile
jurisdiction in late 1976 has meant that a large portion of the regulated area for
the salmon catch has come under the Soviets' exclusive control and that Japan
is not allowed to catch fish there unless otherwise agreed upon. However, the
same commitment by both was retained in the area outside the Soviets' ex-
clusive control. It is true that the isolated treatment of the technical salmon
catch quota issue was conspicuously absent in the early sessions of the 1977
" On this figure, both newspaper accounts and a Fishery Agency official whom the first author
of this paper interviewed in 1977 concurred.
30
 As for an interesting study of Japanese negotiating style, drawing from the pre-World War II
Japanese negotiations, see M. Blaker, Japanese International Negotiating Style (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1977).
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negotiations. The technical fishery issue became linked with a most sensitive
and explosive issue, the territorial problem between the Soviet Union and
Japan. The U.S., Canadian, and EEC declarations of 200-mile jurisdictions in
early 1976 precipitated a declaration to the same effect by the Soviet Union
later in 1976. In reaction, the Japanese Diet, in 1977, passed the 200-mile
jurisdiction bill while the negotiations were going on, thus demonstrating its
resolve that Japan's claim to the disputed Southern Kurile Islands be explicit
against the unilateral Soviet declaration of its sovereignty over these islands.
Consequently, the linkage between the fishery and territorial issues enor-
mously complicated and prolonged the negotiations. The Japanese govern-
ment effectively silenced the discontented fishermen, who were eclipsed by the
nationwide anti-Soviet, nationalistic, irredentist upsurge which was the
response to the two alternatives the government posed at the height of the
difficulty of the negotiations, i.e., fish or territory. And after this
manipulation of public opinion the government came to what the Soviet Union
called a "pragmatic, bureaucratic, business-like approach" to the
negotiations, leaving "high political" issues, i.e. terms of new fishery
agreements which would replace the Convention of 1956, to the negotiations
which were to be held later in 1977 and thereafter. Thus, when the salmon
catch quota of 1977 was agreed upon by Japan and the Soviet Union in late
spring 1977, the negotiations in the Commission only dealt with "low
political" issues. In other words, at the end of the spring negotiations of 1977
the quota issue was isolated from "high political" issues.31 The relative in-
dependence of the Commission was partially destroyed by the above-described
politicization. However, for the same reason as the one we have just explained,
the Commission's relative independence was retained at the final phase of the
negotiations, since "high political" issues were to be dealt with later in other
separate negotiations. The stability of the negotiators was also partially im-
paired by this politicization. But again, for the same reason, the stability and
continuity of the negotiators were basically retained at the last phase of the
quota negotiations. Thus, it must be emphasized that as far as salmon catch
quota negotiations—as distinguished from more "high political" negotiations
on new fishery agreements replacing the one concluded in 1956—are con-
cerned, the basic structural components did not change very much. Internal
mechanisms for determining the initial proposals, the Japanese quota, and the
Soviet plan did not undergo fundamental changes. Rather they remained more
or less the same. The predictive performance of the structural equation model
31
 See the Nihon Keizai Shimbun or any other major Japanese newspapers from December 1976
to August 1977 for the day-to-day accounts of the sequence of the 1977 negotiations. See also
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of Decrementalism: The Case of Soviet-Japanese Salmon Catch Negotiations, 1957-1977,"
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for the proposals, the Japanese quota, and the Soviet plan substantiates this
assertion.
Conclusions
Having adopted a somewhat unorthodox approach to the study of
negotiation, we have attempted to show that the quasi-budgeting framework
can be fruitfully employed for the study of negotiation. We have attempted to
show, largely through examples, that if certain conditions are met, various
negotiations can be submitted to an empirically testable formal analysis.
Our estimation results have been demonstrated to be fairly strong, indi-
cating that our perspective is a powerful way of looking at such a phenom-
enon. Although the results are not without somewhat slightly discouraging
"anomalies" such as the low R2 and the possible presence of a serial
correlation for the JIP equation (1957-1976), most of the R2s are generally
very high except for the JIP and SIP equation (1957-1976); all the regression
coefficients have "right" signs; about two-thirds of the regression coefficients
are statistically significant at the 5 percent level; Durbin-Watson statistics are
around 1.4 to 2.7; and residual plots look fine with perhaps the exception of
the above-mentioned JIP equation (1957-1976). In short, our structural equa-
tions model, which derives insights from the two budgeting theories, has been
demonstrated to be basically correct in the context of the Soviet-Japanese
salmon catch negotiations. Although we are not incognizant of alternative ex-
planations, we have shown that the quasi-budgeting explanation is one strong
way of explaining the phenomenon.
Our case has been further strengthened by the good predictive per-
formance of our model. We have used the estimated parameters on the basis of
the 1957-1976 and 1964-1976 data sets to "predict" the 1977 negotiations with
very good results: when the observed values range from 57-87,000 metric tons,
the differences between the observed values and our adjusted "predicted"
values are as small as 700 to 8,800 metric tons. In short, the results are striking.
All the more so because no study of this kind has been done before.
More substantively, we have shown that, despite the periodical "noise"
and "fuss" generated by the fishery issues in the Soviet-Japanese relations
over the last twenty years or so, both countries have learned to encapsulate to a
certain extent, potentially intense conflicts of interest in this aspect of the
bilateral relationship. Although the outcome of the 1978 negotiations, which
are not based on the 1956 Convention, is clearly beyond our present scope, it
might be useful to add a few words about it. In the 1978 negotiations the spirit
of joint preservation and exploitation of the open sea was dashed and almost
entirely replaced by the assertion of the hegemonial coastal state's rights of
controlling all the salmon stock belonging to the Soviet "mother" rivers.
Thus, the spirit underlying the Soviet-Japanese fishery relationship has
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become very similar to the fishery relationship between the United States and
Canada, on the one hand, and Japan, on the other hand, whose pattern was
set by the International North Pacific Fisheries Convention in 1952. More
specifically, the new regulations include: 1) another new large fishing ban area,
north of 44° north latitude, east of 170° west longitude, surrounded by the 200-
mile zones of the United States and the Soviet Union, has been defined; 2)
the agreed quota for the 1978 Japanese catch is 42,500 metric tons; 3) Japan is
to pay the Soviet Union 1.7 billion yen for the 1978 salmon catch in the area;
and 4) annual negotiations are prescribed. (See, for instance, Asahi Shimbun,
21 April 1978.) Since the spirit of the Soviet-Japanese fishery relationship and
the entire institutional relationship have changed, the formula for "predict-
ing" negotiation outcomes cannot be applied to the 1978 case.
Having shown all this, it is still safe to conclude that our argument is both
conceptually powerful and methodologically feasible in the study of various
international negotiations. The present research has been formulated in part to
provide one example for those interested in formally analyzing such
phenomena.
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